



INTERNAL WATER DEFENSE STRATEGIES TO FACE NON MILITARY THREATS

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Abstract

The government's plan to relocate the nation's capital city (IKN) is a hot topic of discussion at this time. After the announcement of the results of the direct election of the president and vice president (pilpres) of the Republic of Indonesia, at the end of April 2019, the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) submitted the results of a study on the relocation of the nation's capital through a limited cabinet meeting. The Bappenas announcement received a pro and contra response from several parties related to the IKN relocation plan. In this study, the method used is descriptive qualitative. The discourse on relocating the nation's capital city (IKN) from Jakarta to East Kalimantan is not only related to geographical and environmental issues, but also to reasons for state security. The relocation of the capital will certainly have positive and negative impacts, one of which is the shifting of the "center of gravity". This is a term for the center of strength as well as the center of vulnerability that determines the victory or defeat of a country in war. Defense strategy analysis shows that the shift is strategically and tactically beneficial. But the benefits are not free. The state defense posture needs to be adjusted, especially the level of strength in Kalimantan must be strengthened. This requires a high commitment from all stakeholders, especially from the budget side.

Keywords: : State Capital (IKN), East Kalimantan, Defense Strategy.

Introduction

The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) is the largest archipelagic state in the world and has three of the nine Sea Line of Communication (SLOC) international waters. This makes Indonesia a country that has a strategic position on the world trade traffic lane (Sea Line of Trade / SLOT) in the territorial waters of its



National jurisdiction. The geographical constellation of Indonesia which consists of water areas with an area of 5.8 million km², a coastline of about 81,000 km and islands of more than 17 thousand islands (Perkasal/24/IV/2011), and the territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia which almost reaches more of 5 million km² and abundant natural resources. With an area and a large number of islands, there are many alternatives to moving the center of government because of its unique expanse and with the land area plus the sea area.

The government's plan to relocate the nation's capital city (IKN) is a hot topic of discussion at this time. After the announcement of the results of the direct election of the president and vice president (pilpres) of the Republic of Indonesia, at the end of April 2019, the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) submitted the results of a study on the relocation of the nation's capital through a limited cabinet meeting. The announcement of Bappenas received pro and contra responses from several parties related to the IKN relocation plan. According to Bappenas, there are six reasons why IKN needs to be relocated. First, to reduce the burden on Jakarta and Jabodetabek. Second, to encourage equitable development in the eastern part of Indonesia. Third, to change the development mindset from Java-centric to Indonesia-centric. Fourth, so that Indonesia has an IKN that represents national identity, diversity and appreciation of Pancasila. Fifth, to improve public services in order to create efficient and effective central government management, and sixth, to have IKN that applies the smart, green, and beautiful city concept to improve regional and international competitiveness (Choirul, 2019). The decision by Bappenas to propose the relocation of IKN was later approved by President-elect Joko Widodo.

The heterogeneity of the population in Jakarta as a result of the central government, the population increases every year due to the rapid flow of urbanization, both in the context of seeking employment and entrepreneurship. This has also resulted in an increase in social problems, along with the data we obtained regarding the aforementioned matters.



Figure 1.1 (Katadata, 2021)

The number of social problems in Jakarta causes Jakarta to be included in the 10 most stressful cities in the world, one of the causes of these social problems is the heterogeneous population and massive numbers, making Jakarta have to accommodate many residents, as in the data below.




Figure 1.2 (Katadata, 2021)

With this massive population, it also causes Jakarta's transportation infrastructure to no longer be able to accommodate, as evidenced by the congestion that occurs in almost all points of Jakarta's main roads, as shown in the data below.




Figure 1.3 (Katadata, 2021)

In terms of security, East Kalimantan is known to have minimal risk of natural disasters such as floods, tsunamis, forest fires, volcanoes and landslides. More importantly, its proximity to the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lane II (ALKI II), will be very important in the connectivity chain, distribution channels and logistics of the Archipelago. The position of East Kalimantan is very strategic as an international sea transportation route because it borders the waters of the Makassar Strait and the Sulawesi Sea, which are ALKI II.

ALKI plays a role in facilitating the transportation of merchant ships crossing the Indonesian archipelago (Kadarisman et al, 2016). The benefits of the availability of the sea route for Indonesia are very large, namely it can increase good trade relations with African, Asian, and Pacific countries. The position of ALKI II is very strategic in terms of both economic and political aspects which will open up opportunities for the development of large ports and international standards that can encourage regional and national economic development (Rustam, 2016).

However, in planning, the relocation of the new state capital must have maximum defense in securing the central government which will later serve as a representation of the existence of a country, including as a response to potential military and non-military threats and how to solve them.

Based on the results of the PPTP study of the Ministry of Defense of East Kalimantan together with the Academic Team of Mulawarman University, there are



seven real and potential non-military threats in East Kalimantan, namely terrorism, drugs, radicalism, potential for social conflict including the presence of foreign workers (POA), the impact of environmental damage, regional border issues, and the negative impact of technology and media information (Prov. Kaltim, 2017).

Samarinda City is the capital city of East Kalimantan Province which is directly adjacent to Kutai Kartanegara Regency. The city of Samarinda is astronomically located between 117 0 03'00" – 117 0 18'14" East Longitude and 000 19'02" – 00 0 42'34" South Latitude with an area of 718 km² based on Government Regulation no. 21 of 1987 concerning the Determination of Regional Boundaries for the Second Level Regional Municipality of Samarinda (RPJP Samarinda City, 2005). The rivers that pass through the city of Samarinda have a considerable influence on the development of the city. One of them is the Mahakam River which is the second longest river in Indonesia. As one of the most important regional economic centers in East Kalimantan, Samarinda City has a strategic position and position in the world maritime axis policy due to its strategic geographical location as the Center of Indonesia. Furthermore, Samarinda City as a candidate for the new capital city is expected to help in the aspects of national defense. That is, the City of Samarinda can maintain the security of the new capital by building a defense system through the existing river areas. With a total of 27 rivers and areas surrounded by Kutai Kertanegara Regency, synchronization, integration, and also harmony are needed in every stage of national development in achieving national goals.

As a buffer city for the new capital, Samarinda City has an important role, for this reason it is necessary to control the defense in Samarinda City, especially in the river sector, policy direction and focus on development and regional development, among others, realizing adequate and modern infrastructure with strategic and integrated objectives, improve accessibility between and between urban areas by using road and bridge infrastructure as well as the availability of land and river transportation system infrastructure (RPJP Kota Samarinda, 2005).



Although we know that East Kalimantan's position is a strategic position because it is located in the middle of Indonesia, the plan to move the capital city has the potential to create new problems, one of which is the defense of the capital against non-military threats. The threat in question is a threat that can later threaten the city of Samarinda and the city of Penajam. Coupled with the location of the city of Samarinda which is close to ALKI II Indonesia, which means that Indonesia must become 'open'. The geographical position that is completely open has the potential to be like the use of the ALKI II area for maneuvering the armed forces of neighboring countries and the impact of the release of the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan, such as illegal fishing and other natural resources. In addition, the effects of the world tourism center in Bali, such as illegal smuggling of goods and human trafficking, as well as terrorism and the effects of Malaysia's expansionary politics, such as the possibility of new territorial claims after successfully controlling the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan, as well as provocations over the Ambalat Block area, is also a potential threat to ALKI II.

The threats in question are grouped into two, namely military threats and non-military threats according to Law no. 34, Regarding the TNI, 2004. Military threats are threats made by the military of one country to another country. Non-military threats can have ideological, political, economic, social, cultural, technological and information dimensions, as well as public safety. Non-military threats have a socio-cultural dimension because they are internal, or arise from within the state. This type of threat has a socio-cultural dimension because it is driven by issues of poverty, ignorance, backwardness, and injustice. These issues are closely related to socio-cultural issues. These issues then develop into starting points for problems, such as separatism, terrorism, violence, and disasters caused by human actions (Indrawan, 2016).

In connection with the Mahakam river in Samarinda which is the lifeblood of transportation, in the field of city defense, we can take lessons from the historical



side of the Battle of Surabaya, which is an important historical example of the struggle for independence of the Indonesian people. The Battle of Surabaya was a war between the Indonesian pro-independence army and militia and the British and British Indian armies. This battle started from 27 October to 20 November 1945. Next, the Padri War which took place around 1821-1838 was a battle between a group of ulama (and their followers) and the indigenous people but later became against the Dutch government. In July 1822 the Dutch troops were pushed into the villages that had been controlled by the Padri on Mount Merapi near the Puar and Banuhampu rivers and finally surrendered. Sungai Puar, which is located in Pelembayan District, Agam Regency, West Sumatra Province, was a guerrilla base during the Second Military Aggression and became the target of a Dutch attack.

Based on several battles that occurred around the river, this can also be applied to Samarinda City as a buffer in supporting the defense and security of the new nation's capital city. Rivers are one of the pillars of social life. Its strategic location both in terms of economy and politics will be able to open up opportunities for rapid development both domestically and abroad.

It is supported by another geographical fact that East Kalimantan with the provincial capital of Samarinda is geographically also close to Malaysia and the Philippines, and also with Sulawesi which supports military installations must be able to coordinate with the police. Command centers for the Army, Navy and Air Force, as well as the National Police can be built close to each other to be able to cooperate between defense and security agencies around the new state capital area (Kapiarsa, 2020). Increased cooperation must also be carried out between the TNI, Polairud, Customs, Port Companies and the Ministry of Transportation in order to create synergy between each stakeholder in the territorial waters.

Community empowerment in water areas can also be done by educating the public about the importance of understanding and awareness of defense and security threats. This can be through increasing the use of digital technology so that it can



build the welfare of the community itself. So that it can be studied and become the basis of reference for Samarinda City and other Regencies as a buffer for the new state capital.

Research methods

In this study, the method used is descriptive qualitative. Qualitative research is methods to explore and understand the meaning of social or human problems. The purpose of conducting qualitative research methods is to gain an understanding of reality through inductive thinking processes. Through qualitative research, researchers can identify the subject and feel what is experienced in daily life. Through the case study research design, this research was carried out in six stages, namely conducting preliminary research, finding and formulating existing problems, collecting data, checking the validity of the data, analyzing and describing the data and drawing conclusions from the results of research that has been carried out.

The approach used in this study is a phenomenological approach which is termed as intersubjective with the meaning that one person's subjectivity can be connected with the subjectivity of others until understanding emerges. Furthermore, in this study the phenomenological approach is more descriptive, the researcher wants to describe how each participant gives meaning to his experience.

Results and Discussion

The discourse on relocating the nation's capital city (IKN) from Jakarta to East Kalimantan is not only related to geographical and environmental issues, but also to reasons for state security. The relocation of the capital will certainly have positive and negative impacts, one of which is the shifting of the "center of gravity". This is a term for the center of strength as well as the center of vulnerability that determines the victory or defeat of a country in war. Defense strategy analysis shows that the shift is strategically and tactically beneficial. But the benefits are not free. The state



defense posture needs to be adjusted, especially the level of strength in Kalimantan must be strengthened. This requires a high commitment from all stakeholders, especially from the budget side.

The center of gravity can be in the form of a geographical area, such as the central government area, the center of the economy, but it can also be in the form of other instruments of national power, such as the military and strategic vital objects. Even in the context of democracy, it can be in the form of political legitimacy. So the form can be tangible (physical)

and intangible (non-physical). At the state level, of course, the most important thing is the center of government (the capital city of the country), and it can also be the center of the economy. Geographically this means Jakarta. When expanded, it means that it may include Java, depending on the strategic calculations. That is the underlying reason why the TNI's strength has been concentrated in Java. The reason is that the Indonesian government is in Java and more than fifty percent of Indonesia's population and economy are concentrated in Java. This is a simple description of Indonesia's center of gravity.

It is not limited to key areas and their functions, but also instruments and ways of defending these key areas. The ideology of Pancasila, the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (UUD 1945) with the doctrine of the Universal People's Security and Defense System (Sishankamrata), diversity, the principles of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and even the TNI, can be included. Which is considered the key force to subdue Indonesia, that is the center of gravity, and that must be the main mission of the enemy.

First, the two centers of gravity (the center of the economy and the center of government) which were previously centered on one region or one island, are now split into two. This diversification closes the vulnerability of the two functions being destroyed at once with one attack. Second, the battlefield on the island of Borneo is much more profitable operationally and tactically than on the island of Java. For



Indonesia's defensive defense doctrine, the condition of dense forests, and various natural obstacles in the form of large rivers and mountains along the Indonesia-Malaysia land border is very advantageous.

The relocation of the Indonesian capital city to Kalimantan is designed for a long-term vision, towards Indonesia Onward 2050. The 2050 State Defense Plan, especially the protection of the capital city as Indonesia's center of gravity, must be an important part of the design. National defense concerns the sovereignty and survival of the nation and state. Therefore, it takes a shared vision and a high commitment from all components of the nation to make it happen.

In accordance with the provisions of the Convention and the Indonesian Waters Law, Indonesian waters include Indonesian territorial seas, Indonesian archipelagic waters, and Indonesian inland waters (Tahar, 2014). Article 7 of Law no. 6 of 1996 concerning Indonesian Waters, stipulates that in archipelagic waters, for delimitation of inland waters, the Government of Indonesia may draw closing lines at the mouths of rivers, estuaries, bays, tributaries, and ports. Where the inland waters consist of: (a) the inland sea, namely the part of the sea located on the land side of the closing line, on the sea side of the low water line; and (b) inland waters, namely all waters located on the land side of the low water line, except at the mouth of the river. inland waters are all waters located on the land side of the river mouth closing line (Tahar, 2015).

The various types of riverine operations can be categorized based on covering most of the above situations and missions (Grau, 2014). Amphibious operations themselves are used to access land and by using naval and land elements, and one of its forms is river operations carried out to control inland rivers, lakes, and other shallow water areas.

According to N1, there is a military threat that has the potential to occur, namely the infiltration and attack of the IKN as the Center of Gravity, which is an inland river route around the city of Samarinda, which is a landing route that can be



taken or by taking steps to maximize underwater technologies or drones. While the majority of non-military threats are violations that are the authority of law enforcement in border areas, but this non-military potential can also become military potential if there is no synergy in the enforcement of both military and non-military institutions.

Based on the Indonesian defense white paper, non-military threats are essentially threats that use non-military factors that are considered to have capabilities that endanger state sovereignty, the territorial integrity of the country, and the safety of the entire nation.

In the inland waters in Indonesia, especially in the Mahakam river area in Samarinda, there are 3 highest threats that become urgency. Non-military threats that can be found are related to social conflicts, natural disasters, and illegal logging. The defense strategy of inland waters is closely related to non-military threats. In this study the inland waters in question are rivers, namely the Mahakam River in the city of Samarinda. As we know that the Mahakam River is a means of water transportation that greatly affects community activities in East Kalimantan.

In addition, security in inland waters, especially on the Mahakam River, is very necessary because downstream rivers and tributaries can become a place for foreign ships or small ships to enter which can be a threat to the state. As explained in chapter 2, during the Dutch colonial period, the Kalimas River used the Kalimas River to reach the main port in Surabaya and made the riverbanks as storage warehouses and liaisons with the interior. From this case we can see that rivers / inland waters can trigger the entry of foreign parties who will become a threat to the state. Learning from what was done by the Dutch, the defense system for inland waters needs to be our concern. Therefore, in the defense of inland waters a strategy is needed that has ways, means, and ends in dealing with non-military threats. According to N1, the relevant parties are expected to further optimize the capabilities



of personnel and infrastructure development, such as naval posts downstream of rivers, tributary routes, and strategic locations for non-military threats.

Based on the data that has been collected, in order to overcome the various non-military threats found in the inland waters of Indonesia, according to N3, it is necessary to build more SPKKL (Marine Security and Safety Monitoring Stations). In addition, there is also a need for Supervision and Law Enforcement in the Shipping sector through Law No. 17/2008 1985 which is the duty and authority of the Indonesian National Police, Indonesian Navy, Ministry of Transportation, Bakamla. And also Supervision and Law Enforcement in the forestry sector through Law No. 41/1999 is the duty and authority of the Indonesian National Police, Ministry of Forestry, Attorney General's Office, Courts. In addition, according to N4, in order to overcome the threats found, it is also necessary to build a river defense system in the city of Samarinda in the review of the strategic development plan of human resources, infrastructure and strategies for TNI in Kalimantan in dealing with non-military threats to support national defense.

SISHANKAMRATA is a defense and security system that involves all citizens, territories and all Indonesian national resources prepared for times of peace, war and post-war. N4 said that the National Defense System is a universal defense system that involves all citizens. The Universal People's Defense and Security Doctrine (Hankamrata Doctrine)

The Universal People's Defense and Security System (SISHANKAMRATA) as mandated in Article 30 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, and has been described in various laws and regulations concerning National Defense and Security. Populist, universal, and regional values are relatively fixed, but in their implementation they are always adjusted to the dynamics of changes in the strategic environment, as well as the threats, challenges, obstacles, disturbances, and opportunities they pose to Indonesia's national interests.



The connection with the National Capital, which is seen as the Center of Gravity Indonesia, is something that must be protected and its defenses built. But in the administration of the State and its implementation, it cannot be separated from logistical support. Especially defense logistics, if you look at the object of research, Samarinda City can be a strategic location that we can maximize for the location and location of defense logistics storage. This can be explained through the existing military and non-military postures in the East Kalimantan region, as well as from the point of view of regional logistics based on SISHANKAMRATA.

In war, controlling rivers is often important to control a country. The purpose of river operations is to facilitate or stem river traffic, or the river can be a supporter of the main purpose on the banks of the river. Military threats that have the potential to occur are infiltration and attacks on the State Capital as the Center of Gravity through the river which is part of the inland waters in Samarinda City. It can also be a takeable landing strip or by maximizing underwater or drone technologies.

Meanwhile, non-military threats are violations that are the authority of law enforcement in border areas, but this non-military potential can also become military potential if there is no synergy in the enforcement of both military and non-military institutions. Non-military threats that can be found are related to social conflicts, natural disasters, and illegal logging.

The policy based on the Indonesian defense white paper, Non-military threats are essentially threats that endanger the sovereignty of the state, the territorial integrity of the country, and the safety of the entire nation. Non-military threats can have ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, technological and information dimensions, as well as public safety. In dealing with non-military threats, placing Ministries/Institutions (K/L) outside the defense sector as the Main Element assisted by Other Elements of National Power. In addition, there is also a need for Supervision and Law Enforcement in the Shipping sector through Law No. 17/2008



1985 which is the duty and authority of the Indonesian National Police, Indonesian Navy, Ministry of Transportation, Bakamla.

The Strategic Document of the 21st Century Universal People's Defense and Security System, explains the development of National Defense capabilities that reflect the universality of relying on human resources as the center of national defense power (Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, 2021). As well as Law No. 23 of 2019 concerning Management of National Resources for National Defense by preparing reserve components and supporting components, where the reserve components become non-military defense.

Efforts to strengthen the defense strategy of inland waters in East Kalimantan related to the New Capital City are as follows: Strengthening security in inland waters on the Mahakam River is very necessary in the downstream and tributaries, because it becomes a place for foreign ships or small ships to enter which can be a threat. for the state, Optimizing personnel capabilities and infrastructure development such as Naval posts downstream of rivers, tributary routes and strategic locations for non-military threats, Procurement related to patrol boats that can secure the Mahakam river route, Synergy between institutions is required government in the field of defense and non-defense in supporting the creation of safe and controlled Indonesian inland waters. Also establish an integrated joint task force or Kogasgabpad between the TNI and other ministries according to the authority or potential threats, The need to build more SPKKL (Sea Safety and Security Monitoring Stations), The need to build a river defense system in the city of Samarinda in the HR strategic development plan , infrastructure and strategies for the Indonesian Navy in the Kalimantan area in dealing with non-military threats to support national defense.

Development of a maritime regional command for IKN, with ideal anchorage facilities in carrying out marine security functions in ALKI II and having a fleet of ships, having a maritime defense unit or coastal missile command for the maritime area.



Consideration and further study related to policies, doctrines and postures related to the defense of inland waters for military and non-military threats. So that this research can make a new concept or theory about the defense of inland waters in Indonesia, and academically it can be continued into further research, namely: The strategy of inland waters defense to deal with military threats in the New Capital City, due to the limitations of researchers in our research, Strategy defense of inland waters on large islands in Indonesia, due to the desire of the Ministry of Defense to build defense forces on large islands in Indonesia, synergy between defense and non-defense government agencies in the sea area, the need for policies that can synergize into command combined task.

Conclusion

The relocation of the National Capital City has also shifted the center of strength of the Indonesian state's "center of gravity" to East Kalimantan. The shift in the center of gravity requires strategic analysis, especially since there are many inland waters around the New Capital City. Therefore, in the defense of inland waters a strategy is needed that has ways, means, and ends in dealing with non-military threats, the absence of a Defense Strategy for Inland Waters has made us researchers create a new concept of the PEPROTEC Trias, namely: People (Means) regarding military and non-military resources. -military; Process (Ways) regarding policies; Technology (Ends) regarding infrastructure

In order to have a defense strategy in inland waters, a policy is needed as a legal umbrella and military and military resources to achieve this strategy.

Article 7 of Law no. 6 of 1996 concerning Indonesian Waters, stipulates that in archipelagic waters, for delimitation of inland waters, the Government of Indonesia may draw closing lines at the mouths of rivers, estuaries, bays, tributaries, and ports. Where the internal waters consist of: The inland sea, namely the part of the sea



located on the land side of the closing line, on the sea side of the low water line; and inland waters, namely all waters located on the land side of the low water line, except at the mouth of the river. inland waters are all waters located on the land side of the line closing the mouth of the river.

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