

PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT IN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE (CASE STUDY AT KODAM III SILIWANGI)


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Abstract - This research is motivated by the phenomenon of threatening national defense in West Java. The objectives of this study are (1) To analyze the threat of national defense in West Java; (2) To analyze the performance intelligence detachment of 3rd military regional command (KODAM III)/Siliwangi in overcoming the threat of national defense in West Java; and (3) To analyze the strategy intelligence detachment of 3rd military regional command (KODAM III)/Siliwangi in improving performance to overcome the threat of national defense in West Java. The research method used is qualitative. The results showed that; (1) State defense threats in West Java are related to ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural and security threats; (2) The performance intelligence detachment of 3rd military regional command (KODAM III)/Siliwangi in overcoming the threat of national defense in West Java is related to the collection, analysis, counter intelligence and covert operations. As for the implementation, Kodam III Siliwangi did some support such as data collection, deepening, raising, coordination and social communication; and (3) Strategy intelligence detachment of 3rd military regional command (KODAM III)/Siliwangi in improving performance in order to overcome the threat of national defense in West Java through improving the capability of soldiers, increasing the quantity of soldiers, increasing the responsiveness of information and situations, and improving facilities and infrastructure through procurement based on priorities. The conclusion of the research shows that the performance intelligence detachment of 3rd military regional command (KODAM III)/Siliwangi is quite good but it needs strengthening based on priority scale.

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
Introduction

National defense is currently an interesting issue where national defense is related to the state's efforts to build and uphold its sovereignty, besides that the state as much as possible defends the territorial integrity of the country and ensures the safety of the nation from various military and non-military threats in order to maintain the existence of the state.

State defense is also related to the state's efforts to achieve national goals in the context of the welfare of the state and people. Every country, including Indonesia, is obligated to carry out national defense, especially since Indonesia is an archipelagic country and has a wide maritime jurisdiction which, when viewed from geopolitics and geostrategy, certainly has a strategic position in terms of regional and inter-state relations.

Based on Indonesia's strategic position, of course, this has not only become a potential for maintaining the existence of the state, but also potential threats from ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural and defense conditions. The potential threat can be in the form of increasing uncertainty and uncertainty (turbulence and uncertainty).

Besides that, today's society is getting bolder with various demands and increasingly fierce competition as well as the emergence of various pressures on the state and challenges or even threats from various directions against the state, including the threat of state disintegration.




Based on the Indonesian Defense White Paper 4(2015), there are two threats in the form of real threats and unreal threats. The real threats are related to terrorism, radicalism, separatism, natural disasters, violation of border areas, piracy and theft of natural resources, disease outbreaks, cyber attacks and espionage for drug trafficking and abuse. While the threats that are not yet real are threats that have not been prioritized based on strategic threats, threats in the form of open conflict/conventional war and various threats that will also have the potential to occur.

In the context of threats, Kusnanto 5stated that the source of threat regarding national security is becoming increasingly complex, which includes not only threats from within (internal threats) and/or external threats (external threats), but also involves azymetric threats that are global in nature without being categorized as threats. outside or inside. In this regard, the nature of threat has changed to be multidimensional. Today's threats are becoming more and more complex and of course can be a threat to national security, including the security of the National Capital, namely DKI Jakarta.

The security structure of DKI Jakarta is so complex when it comes to the importance of the role of the buffer zone to contribute more to strengthening the security of the defense area. DKI Jakarta cannot stand alone in defense, but rather the importance of the role of the buffer zone so that defense connectivity occurs. Buffer areas in principle can support various implementations of land defense empowerment where this is related to the existence of the security of the capital city which can be assumed as a reflection of the security of a

⁴ Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia Indonesian Defense White Paper. (Jakarta: Kemehan , 2015).

⁵ Kusnanto, Anggoro, National Security, National Defense, and Public Order, National Law Development Agency, (Jakarta: Ministry of Justice and Human Rights RI, 2003), p 5.




country. Thus, it is clear that the contribution of the buffer zone can at least have a positive effect on regional security assistance in DKI Jakarta.

One of the buffer areas of DKI Jakarta is West Java, this province has a strategic geography and of course it will be related to the support for the empowerment of the capital's land defense where part of its territory surrounds the National Capital. This basis places Kodam III/Siliwangi as a strategic compartment having duties and functions in efforts to uphold sovereignty and maintain the territorial integrity of the country, defending territorial integrity from various threats in the area of responsibility. To be able to carry out this task, Kodam III/Siliwangi must have a line of units capable of supporting defense. One of the strategic units in supporting the defense of West Java is the Intelligence Detachment of Kodam III/Siliwangi which can contribute to providing continuous intelligence data for the purpose of estimating threats in the Kodam III/Siliwangi area.

The mechanism for the activities of the Intelligence Detachment of Kodam III/Siliwangi in the investigation is carried out based on the work program and analysis of the development of the regional situation from the results of early detection investigations that are carried out continuously. Meanwhile, intelligence operations are carried out based on plans to achieve specific objectives, in a limited space-time relationship and on the basis of orders. In accordance with its function, the activities of the Intelligence Detachment of Kodam III/Siliwangi in carrying out investigation activities and operations are carried out to determine the escalation of threats in their area of responsibility and early detection and early warning of developments in the situation in their area.


However, empirically, the phenomena that occur indicate an indication of the development of symptoms that interfere with security in the West Java



area, such as activities that threaten diology, politics, economics, socio-culture and defense and security. Based on reports in dealing with the contingency of Denintel Kodam III Siliwangi, there are still social conflicts in Majalengka and Sumedang, there are still terrorist networks and acts of terrorism being prepared in the West Java area and the strengthening of potential and demonstration activities that lead to riots. In addition, there are still disturbances with political, economic and ideological nuances in various regions, which proves the performance of the Intelligence Detachment of Kodam III/Siliwangi.

Regarding this problem, the implementation of the Kodam III/Siliwangi Intelligence Detachment early detection system which has been carried out continuously has not shown optimal performance in an effort to determine the escalation of threats in the area of responsibility. The initial findings show that in an effort to overcome the threat to national defense, Denintel Kodam III/Siliwangi still has several limitations, such as the quality/competence and quantity of human resources, limited budget, facilities and infrastructure, especially related to intelligence technology. This problem is quite a dilemma when Denintel Kodam III/Siliwangi, who is the eyes and ears of the TNI, provides an early warning system for various national defense threats, especially in West Java, which may also have an impact on the security of the DKI Jakarta area.

The formation of the strategic formulation of the Deintel Kodam III Siliwangi became an urgency when the phenomenon of the strengthening of the national defense threat and the problem of the limitations of the Deintel Kodam III Siliwangi had implications for the suboptimal performance of Denintel in overcoming the threat of national defense in West Java. Based on the research gap, it is clear that the importance of this research is to formulate



relevant strategies that can allow the performance of the Deinintel Kodam III Siliwangi to be optimal. Thus, this research focuses on "The Strategy of Denitel Kodam III Siliwangi in Improving Performance to Overcome the Threat of National Defense in West Java"


Based on the description of the previous background, the formulation of the problem formulation in this thesis research is related to the threat of national defense in West Java, the performance of Denintel Kodam III Siliwangi in overcoming the threat of national defense in West Java and the strategy of Denintel Kodam III Siliwangi in improving performance to overcome the threat of national defense in West Java. West Java.

Research methods

The selection of qualitative methods in this study basically wants to obtain and describe the symptoms, information or information regarding the strategy of Denintel Kodam III Siliwangi in improving performance in order to overcome the threat of national defense in West Java. While the design used is phenomenology, this design is an approach that focuses more on the concept of a particular phenomenon and the form of the study is to see and understand the meaning of an experience related to a particular phenomenon.

Given that this article is about strategy, it is necessary to explain what strategy is. Meiser 6explains that "Strategy is related to ends + ways + means = strategy". The strategy formula interacts with the simple notion of means to create situations in which strategy is reduced to allocating resources. This approach is the best way to foster policy stability.

⁶ Meiser Jeffrey W., Are Our Strategic Models Flawed? Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy. Journal Parameters 46(4)., (2017), p. 82.



The concept of strategy ends + ways + means = strategy. Also explained by Arthur F. Lykke Jr. 7gives a description of its formulation: "Strategy equals goals (goals towards which) and means (actions) plus means (instruments by which some goals can be achieved)." This formula is deeply ingrained in the minds of US military officers and analysts. Meiser 8explains that in practice, the means of formula elements are much more difficult to conceptualize than goals (goals) and resources (means). Most discussions about how to treat it as a synonym for action plans.

In addition to strategy, it is also necessary to explain related to performance where Mathis and Jackson 9stated that "Performance is basically what an employee does or does not do. Employee performance common to most jobs includes the following elements: (1) Quantity of output; (2) Quality of output; (3) Timelines of output; (4) Presence at work; (5) Cooperativeness". From the description above, performance is basically what employees do or don't do.


Based on the description of the performance theory, it can be concluded that performance refers to the results achieved by comparing with the goals and objectives. In addition, organizational performance as the actual result or output of an organization that is measured against the desired output of the organization. In particular, performance can be managed by manipulating the factors that cause it. These factors cover a wide range of variables.

Results and Discussion

⁸ Ibid ,. p . 83.

⁷ Ibid ,.

⁹ Mathis and Jackson, H. John H. Human Resources Management. (Jakarta: Selembah Empat, 2006), p. 382.



Threats to state defense in West Java consist of: Ideology, Radical groups have the opportunity to continue to undermine the ideology of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, including in the form of the doctrine of Islamic Sharia.

Politics, There have been political efforts to undermine the authority of the government through spreading hoax news on social media.


Economy, Decline in purchasing power as a result of soaring prices of basic needs of the community and the occurrence of scarcity of one of the staples or certain goods

Social and Cultural, . The occurrence of SARA nuanced conflicts and demonstrations by raising various actual issues from the student and labor movements, by taking advantage of various moments.

Defense and Security, Entry of illegal immigrants or even terrorist networks, Violations of visit visas and foreign workers and violations of visit visas and foreign workers

The Performance of Denintel Kodam III Siliwangi in Overcoming National Defense Threats in West Java

Based on the discussion, it can be concluded that the performance of Denintel Kodam III Siliwangi in overcoming the threat to national defense in West Java is related to complex aspects related to the duties and functions of intelligence. In general, the performance of Denintel Kodam III Siliwangi in overcoming the threat of national defense in West Java is quite good, as evidenced by the relatively conducive situation in various regions of West Java. Apart from the results of research findings and various theories of obstacles or things that interfere with intelligence performance, of course it is urgent to find/formulate various strategies in order to improve performance, while in the context of this research strategy is related to the efforts of Denintel Kodam III



Siliwangi in improving performance in order to overcome threat to national defense in West Java.


Strategy of Denintel Kodam III Siliwangi in Improving Performance to Overcome National Defense Threats in West Java.

It is important to note that the formulation of the Denintel Kodam III Siliwangi strategy in improving performance to overcome the threat of national defense in West Java takes into account the priority scale. The priority scale is the size of the needs that are arranged in a list based on the level of a person's needs, starting from the most important needs to the needs that can be delayed fulfillment. With the priority scale, Denintel Kodam III Siliwangi is expected to be able to know which needs must be prioritized and which needs can be postponed first. Thus, Denintel Kodam III Siliwangi can meet the needs appropriately and according to capabilities. The strategies are as follows:

Soldier Ability Strategy

Basically a soldier who has the ability means that he will be able to carry out the tasks assigned to him. It should be emphasized that it does not mean that you do not have the ability, but that there are still some intelligence capabilities to support the tasks and functions of the Deinteldam organizationally. Ability relates to the individual's capacity to carry out various tasks in a job. Thus the capability of soldiers is an urgent aspect to be improved in order to support the operational readiness of Deninteldam in order to improve the performance of individual soldiers which leads to organizational performance.

Methods in improving the ability of Deinteldam soldiers can be done through internal education (military/service) and external education




(State/Private Universities). Internal education through the involvement of soldiers in the context of internal strengthening of the organization through technical guidance, training and involvement of soldiers in military schools is seen as a way out in order to improve the ability of soldiers from Denintel Kodam III Siliwangi. While external education, namely through non-military institutions such as undergraduate or postgraduate in universities, which of course can enable the reasoning abilities of soldiers and is an up-to-date step for intelligence knowledge that continues to develop and dynamically. The selection of internal and external education is based on the priority needs of Deinteldam for each soldier who does have different needs from one another.

The results that can be achieved through this strategy are that it can produce capable soldiers so that it makes it easier to complete each job effectively and efficiently without any difficulties so that it will produce a job or good performance. With capable soldiers, of course, they will support various analyzes, especially early detection that is more accurate, clear and detailed so that various threats can be anticipated.

Soldier Quantity Strategy

Basically, the quantity is related to the need for Denintel Kodam III Siliwangi in operationalizing its duties and functions, especially related to overcoming the threat of national defense in West Java. Quantity is needed in order to meet the needs of human resources that can reach the breadth of West Java Province. HR is important because intelligence analysis still focuses on the ability of HR in assessing a phenomenon in various regions. For this reason, the quantity and coverage of areas must be fulfilled immediately so that policy responsiveness or technical steps can be faster.

The method in the quantity of soldiers is through gradual recruitment in accordance with the priority scale of personnel needs. The recruitment of




soldiers is also carried out, of course, by considering the budget allocation as well as considering the proportion of equitable distribution of intelligence and the need for information in the future. On this side, it is clear that there must be a priority scale for specification and classification of intelligence needs in order to actively detect threats.

The results that can be achieved through this strategy are the establishment of optimization of the tasks and functions of the Denintel Kodam III Siliwangi due to the massive support of the number of soldiers so that information on national defense threats throughout the West Java region can be detected. clearly in accordance with the responsibilities of the assignment.

Information and Situation Development Strategy

Basically the rapid development of information and the situation has implications for the increasingly difficult situation to predict so that national defense threats can be detected slowly or even not detected at all. The development of information is not commensurate with the readiness of Deinteldam in anticipating various threats to national defense. Compared to the vast area of West Java, it certainly has an impact on the complexity of the information and the situation that occurs.

The method in developing information and situations is to procure hardware and software that has technology related to a summary of the dynamics that occur in the virtual world environment. The summary can be analyzed without first coming to the object location, while if it is deemed necessary, the summary will be used as the basis for initial intelligence operations. This is related to efficiency where the operational budget for the analysis is certain to be limited, the selection of methods through technology to support the analysis is important in making a clear initial analytical framework. As for the hardware and software independence option, it can



cooperate with universities and state-owned enterprises in creating hardware and software related to technology, which summarizes the development of information and the situation at a certain time. This is not only done on a priority scale, but gradually and systematically.

The results that can be achieved through this strategy are the responsiveness of summary results that move in cyberspace so that various problems in the West Java area are detected and the information is distributed to the Upper Command in a responsive manner. This strategy will have implications for resource efficiency, including budget and human resources.


Facilities and Infrastructure Strategy

Basically means are everything that can be used as tools and materials to achieve the aims and objectives of an intelligence analysis production process. Meanwhile, infrastructure is everything that is the main support for the production of intelligence analysis.

The method in facilities and infrastructure is to conduct a thorough evaluation of the existing facilities and infrastructure. With the evaluation of the Denintel Kodam III Siliwangi, we can see which facilities and infrastructure are procurement priorities. If the budget is very limited, things that can be done are optimizing the available facilities and infrastructure and building partnerships with other institutions regarding the need or the unavailability of facilities and infrastructure in accordance with applicable regulations.

The results that can be achieved through this strategy are speeding up the work implementation process so as to save time, energy and budget. In addition, it can increase the productivity of responsiveness-oriented analysis.

Based on the results of the study, it can be seen that the strategy of Denintel Kodam III Siliwangi in improving performance to overcome national



defense threats in West Java is carried out through increasing the ability of soldiers, increasing the quantity of soldiers, increasing the responsiveness of information and situations and improving facilities and infrastructure through procurement based on priorities.


Conclusion

From the results of the research that has been done, the following conclusions can be drawn: The threat of state defense in West Java is built up through the dynamic situation in the West Java region which is so complex in terms of population characteristics and area. The results showed that the threat to national defense in West Java consisted of ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural and defense threats.

The performance of Denintel Kodam III Siliwangi in overcoming the threat of national defense in West Java is related to complex aspects related to the duties and functions of intelligence. In general, the performance of Denintel Kodam III Siliwangi in overcoming the threat of national defense in West Java is quite good, as evidenced by the relatively conducive situation in various regions of West Java.

The strategy of Denintel Kodam III Siliwangi in improving performance to overcome the threat of national defense in West Java is carried out by taking into account the priority scale through increasing the capability of soldiers, increasing the quantity of soldiers, increasing the responsiveness of information and situations as well as improving facilities and infrastructure through gradual procurement.

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